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Stumbling at the Finish Line: Employment 
Discrimination and the Utah Supreme Court in 
Burton v. Exam Center Industrial 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Bias Allowed at Small Utah Firms”1 announced the arrival of 
the Utah Supreme Court’s closely contested (three-two) decision in 
Burton v. Exam Center Industrial.2 While the court correctly chose 
between an individual’s right to be employed regardless of age and 
the Utah legislature’s express intent to limit that right, the majority’s 
failure to clearly analyze Burton’s claim made its opinion appear 
poorly reasoned and its decision more difficult than necessary. Nor-
mally, such a failure would be harmless. However, as the issues that 
faced the court in Burton continue to surface in the future, the need 
for clear and complete reasoning will become increasingly apparent. 
This Note begins in Part II with a discussion of the relevant por-
tions of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act (UADA) and overviews the 
tort of discharge in violation of a public policy. Part III then briefly 
explains the factual and procedural background of the Burton deci-
sion. Part IV analyzes the reasoning of the majority and dissenting 
opinions, focusing on two specific issues. First, it compares the 
strengths of the policy-related arguments made by the majority and 
dissent in Burton, concluding that the majority offered the stronger 
arguments. Second, it examines Burton’s claim in relation to estab-
lished Utah law governing the tort of discharge in violation of a pub-
lic policy—a step the Burton majority never took. This analysis shows 
that the Utah Supreme Court rightfully rejected Burton’s claim but 
failed to carefully compare Burton’s claims with the tort’s require-
ments. Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
This Note contends that, while the court reached the correct de-
cision in Burton, a lack of thorough analysis of one key area of law 
makes the opinion appear more difficult than it truly was. Like view-
 
 1. Ray Rivera, Bias Allowed at Small Utah Firms, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 20, 2000, at 
A1. The view taken by the Deseret News was somewhat softer. See, Age Bias Ruled Not Illegal 
in Small Firms, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 20, 2000, at B6. 
 2. No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000). 
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ing a runner, who after dominating a race, stumbles at the finish line 
and barely finishes ahead of the nearest competitor, one walks away 
from the Burton majority opinion with the impression that the race 
was much closer than it really was. 
II. BACKGROUND 
To understand the issues that faced the Utah Supreme Court in 
Burton, some understanding of the UADA and the tort of discharge 
in violation of a public policy is essential. This section recounts the 
relevant provisions of the UADA and explains the history and ele-
ments of the tort at common law. 
A. The UADA3 
When an employee wishes to bring a claim of employment dis-
crimination based on age, the UADA provides the employee’s exclu-
sive state law remedy.4 Thus, the employee cannot also raise the tort 
claim of discharge in violation of a public policy. The UADA governs 
both the process and remedies available to the employee. This sec-
tion reviews the legislative history of federal legislation upon which 
the UADA is based, some of the statute’s essential provisions, and 
the extensive administrative process that an employee must follow to 
bring an employment discrimination claim under the statute. 
1. Legislative history by inference 
Unfortunately, the legislative history of the UADA was not re-
corded. However, as the UADA is based on both Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the federal Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA), many of the Utah legislature’s concerns can 
be inferred from the legislative history of those federal acts. 
The underlying legislative goal of Title VII and subsequent legis-
lation (including state equivalents, such as the UADA) was to elimi-
nate discrimination from U.S. society. However, these legislative acts 
have limited application. Title VII, for example, exempts employers 
with fewer than fifteen employees from compliance.5 Similarly, the 
 
 3. At the time Burton commenced, the UADA was codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 
34-35-1 (1994). The UADA is presently located at UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-1 (1998). 
However, the issues in question were unaffected by this change. 
 4. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-107(15) (1998). 
 5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994). 
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ADEA exempts employers that have less than twenty employees.6 
These limitations show that Congress considered other factors be-
sides its desire to combat discrimination in implementing Title VII 
and related legislation.7 
More specifically, while eliminating discrimination drove Con-
gress’s implementation of Title VII’s general framework (which in-
cludes the ADEA), at least two additional concerns influenced Con-
gress’s decision to limit the legislation’s applicability. First, Congress 
did not want to intrude on the highly personal and intimate relation-
ships associated with small employers, recognizing that many small 
employers are family-operated businesses.8 Acknowledging that per-
sonal and intimate relationships frequently form part of such busi-
nesses, Congress concluded that the government should refrain from 
unduly intruding into the small-business environment.9 
Second, Congress desired to protect businesses with limited re-
sources from the costs and burdens resulting from compliance with 
the federal statute and any resulting litigation.10 As the Seventh Cir-
cuit recognized, this concern also applied to the ADEA’s twenty em-
ployee exemption, which was instituted “to spare very small firms 
from the potentially crushing expense of mastering the intricacies of 
the antidiscrimination laws, establishing procedures to assure compli-
ance, and defending against suits when efforts at compliance fail.”11 
Thus, the competing public policy concerns contemplated by 
Congress in implementing Title VII and the ADEA indicate the deli-
cate balance Congress attempted to achieve: eliminating discrimina-
tion while avoiding unnecessarily intruding into intimate, personal 
relationships or burdening small employers with the costs of compli-
 
 6. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994). 
 7. Amicus for Utah Manufacturers advanced a similar argument. See Brief for Amicus 
Utah Manufacturers at 19, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 
(Utah Jan. 19, 2000). In addition to noting the cost of compliance, amicus also argued that 
the legislative history indicates a concern that government control over small businesses would 
cause the government to become involved in relationships of small businesses that are often 
intimate or familial in nature. See id. at 18. 
 8. See generally 110 CONG. REC. 13,085-88 (June 9, 1964). 
 9. See generally id. 
 10. See Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Birkbeck 
v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that limiting application 
of the ADEA to businesses with more than 20 employers was to reduce the burden of the 
ADEA on small employers). 
 11. Papa, 166 F.3d at 940 (citations omitted); see also Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at 510. 
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ance. The result was limited coverage of Title VII and the ADEA to 
employers with a certain number of employees, “[striking] a balance 
between the goal of stamping out all discrimination and the goal of 
protecting small entities from the hardship of litigating discrimina-
tion claims.”12 The Utah Legislature’s decision to limit the UADA to 
employers with at least fifteen employees likely involved concerns 
similar to those of Congress. 
2. The UADA’s policy provisions 
The UADA clearly forbids discrimination on the basis of age. 
The statute establishes that it is a discriminatory, or prohibited, em-
ployment practice “[f]or an employer to refuse to hire, or promote, 
or discharge. . . any person otherwise qualified, because of race, 
color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, 
age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, religion, national 
origin, or handicap.”13 
As previously noted, however, the UADA does not apply to all 
employers. An “employer” is statutorily defined as “the state; any 
political subdivision; board, commission, department, institution, 
school district; . . . or a person employing 15 or more employees within 
the state for each working day in each of 20 calendar weeks or more 
in the current or preceding calendar year.”14 Thus, any private em-
ployer with fewer than fifteen employees is not subject to the provi-
sions of the UADA. The Act also eliminates religious organizations 
or associations and their subsidiaries and agents from its definition of 
an employer.15 
3. UADA procedures 
As “the exclusive remedy under state law for employment dis-
crimination based upon race, . . . age, religion, national origin, or 
disability,”16 the UADA details the procedures through which an ag-
grieved individual must file a claim with the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Division (UADD). The individual, on his own or 
 
 12. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995); see 
also Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at 510. 
 13. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-106(1)(a)(i) (1998). 
 14. § 34A-5-102 (8)(a) (emphasis added). 
 15. § 34A-5-102(8)(b). 
 16. § 34A-5-107(15). 
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through counsel, must sign and file a request for agency action.17 
This request is made under oath and must “be filed within 180 days 
after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice 
occurred.”18 
Before the UADD schedules a hearing on the matter, it assigns 
an investigator to help the parties negotiate a settlement.19 If the par-
ties fail to reach a settlement, however, the investigator is required to 
formally submit findings of fact to the agency director.20 In the event 
that there is insufficient evidence to support the employee’s allega-
tions of discrimination, the director may issue a determination and 
order the dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding.21 Should either 
party desire to appeal the director’s decision, the appeal must be 
made in writing within thirty days of the decision, or the order is-
sued by the director becomes the final order of the commission.22 A 
similar process occurs if the investigator uncovers sufficient evidence 
to support the allegations of discrimination.23 
Subsequent hearings are available if the parties properly appeal, 
and all decisions are subject to judicial review.24 “Conciliation be-
tween the parties is to be urged and facilitated at all stages of the ad-
judicative process . . .” 25 in order to avoid the expense of litigation. 
This emphasis on conciliation is much greater than that found in 
typical civil litigation. 
B. Tortious Discharge in Violation of Public Policy 
Having no recourse under the UADA because his employer had 
fewer than fifteen employees, the Burton plaintiff brought a common 
law claim of tortious discharge in violation of a public policy.26 This 
section reviews the history of this particular tort in Utah and identi-
fies its prima facie elements. 
 
 17. See § 34A-5-107(1). 
 18. § 34A-5-107(1)(c). 
 19. See § 34A-5-107(3)(a). 
 20. See § 34A-5-107(4). 
 21. See § 34A-5-107(4)(b). 
 22. See §§ 34A-5-107(4)(c)-(d). 
 23. See §§ 34A-5-107(8), (9), (12). 
 24. See § 34A-5-107(12). 
 25. § 34A-5-107(10). 
 26. Brief for Appellant at 4, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 
38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000). 
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1. The history of tortious discharge in violation of public policy in Utah 
Utah case law first recognized the tort of discharge in violation 
of a public policy in Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.27 In Berube, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that “[w]here an employee is discharged 
for a reason or in a manner that contravenes sound principles of es-
tablished and substantial public policy, the employee may typically 
bring a tort cause of action against his employer.”28 While affirming 
that statements by the legislature can constitute a public policy, the 
court refused to limit public policy solely to enactments by the state 
legislature.29 The court concluded that “[l]imiting the scope of pub-
lic policy to legislative enactments would necessarily eliminate aspects 
of the public interest which deserve protection. . . . Judicial decisions 
can also enunciate substantial principles of public policy in areas 
which the legislature has not treated.”30 The court also asserted that 
“[n]ot every legislative enactment . . . embodies public policy; only 
those which protect the public or promote public interest qualify.”31 
The Berube court specifically warned against the overuse of the 
principles of public policy in justifying a claim for discharge in viola-
tion of a public policy: “We also stress that actions for wrongful ter-
mination based on this exception must involve substantial and im-
portant public policies.”32 Furthermore, the court committed to 
“construe public policies narrowly and . . . generally utilize those 
based on prior legislative pronouncements or judicial decisions, ap-
plying only those principles which are so substantial and fundamental 
that there can be virtually no question as to their importance for pro-
motion of the public good.”33 
Since Berube, Utah courts have continued to fine-tune the scope 
of public policy on a case-by-case basis.34 Rather than explicitly de-
fine what constitutes a public policy, the Utah Supreme Court ex-
plained in Peterson v. Browning that “declarations of public policy 
can be found in our statutes and constitutions.”35 Such declarations 
 
 27. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
 28. Id. at 1042. 
 29. See id. at 1043. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. (emphasis added). 
 34. See Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1992). 
 35. Id. 
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must be expressed in constitutional or statutory language that clearly 
expresses the public conscience and only occurs “when the affected 
interests of society are substantial.”36 
The Peterson court further indicated that actions falling within 
the public policy exception to at-will employment “typically involve 
termination of employment for (1) refusing to commit an illegal or 
wrongful act, (2) performing a public obligation, or (3) exercising a 
legal right or privilege.”37 The court also declared that an action for 
discharge in violation of a public policy sounded in tort, allowing the 
employee to recover not only economic losses such as back pay but 
also consequential damages (e.g., pain and suffering) and possibly 
punitive damages.38 
2. The elements of discharge in violation of a public policy 
To establish a prima facie case of wrongful discharge in violation 
of a public policy, an employee must satisfy the four-prong test set 
forth in Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, Inc.39 The employee must show 
“(i) that [the] employer terminated [the employee]; (ii) that a clear 
and substantial public policy existed; (iii) that the employee’s con-
duct brought the policy into play; and (iv) that the discharge and the 
conduct bringing the policy into play are causally connected.”40 
If the employee successfully establishes a prima facie case, the 
employer must then “articulate a legitimate reason for the dis-
charge.”41 Should the employer provide sufficient evidence that a le-
gitimate reason prompted the employee’s termination, “the em-
ployee must prove that engaging in the protected conduct was a 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1281 (citing Jill S. Goldsmith, Note, Employment-at-Will-Employers May Not 
Discharge At-Will Employees for Reasons that Violate Public Policy-Wagenseller v. Scottsdale 
Memorial Hospital, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 161, 166-67). In notes 67 through 69, Goldsmith 
describes examples of actions that would meet the four elements. For example, refusing to 
commit an illegal act could cover discharge for an employee who refuses to commit perjury. See 
id. at 166 n.67. Termination of an employee who served on a jury would be an example of 
discharge for performing a public obligation. See id. at 167 n.68. Terminating an employee 
who decided to receive worker’s compensation would be an example of terminating an em-
ployee who was exercising a legal right or privilege. See id. at n.69. 
 38. See id. at 1285. 
 39. 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998). 
 40. Id. at 404. 
 41. Id. at 405. The court indicated that the employer bears the burden of producing 
admissible evidence of another reason for terminating the employee. See id. at 405 n.5. 
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‘substantial factor’ in the employer’s motivation to discharge the 
employee.”42 
III. BURTON V. EXAM CENTER INDUSTRIAL 
A. The Facts 
Exam Center Industrial (“Exam Center”) is an industrial medical 
clinic whose operations include performing physical examinations for 
workers referred to it by other employers.43 Burton worked as a phy-
sician and reported directly to Howard Boulter, who allegedly made 
the decision to terminate Burton and other “older” doctors.44 In ex-
plaining why Burton was discharged, Boulter purportedly stated, “I 
didn’t know how much longer you older guys wanted to work.”45 
Exam Center denied that Boulter made any type of statement 
regarding Burton’s age, contending that Burton was discharged be-
cause Exam Center no longer needed his services.46 
Seeking a remedy under the UADA, Burton filed a discrimina-
tion complaint with the UADD. The UADD rejected his claim, 
however, because Exam Center employed fewer than fifteen indi-
viduals.47 
B. Procedural History 
After the UADD rejected his claim, Burton brought suit against 
Exam Center in state district court, seeking relief for tortious wrong-
ful termination in violation of a public policy.48 Exam Center moved 
for summary judgment, which the district court originally denied but 
then granted on Exam Center’s motion for reconsideration.49 The 
district court then entered an order dismissing Burton’s cause of ac-
 
 42. Id. at 405. 
 43. See Brief for Appellant at 2, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 
38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000). 
 44. See Burton, 2000 WL 38469, at *1. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Brief for Appellee at 5-6, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 
38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000). 
 47. See Burton, 2000 WL 38469, at *1. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
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tion for tortious wrongful termination.50 Burton subsequently ob-
tained leave to bring an interlocutory appeal from the order to the 
Utah Supreme Court.51 Exam Center then filed a Motion for Sum-
mary Disposition with the supreme court.52 
The court heard oral arguments, but requested amicus briefs 
prior to rendering a decision.53 After receiving the amicus briefs, the 
court allowed each party to file a response brief. 
C. The Utah Supreme Court’s Holding 
On January 19, 2000, the Utah Supreme Court announced its 
decision: by a narrow three-to-two margin, the court rejected Bur-
ton’s claim affirming the district court’s decision.54 Chief Justice 
Howe, writing for the majority, indicated that Burton had failed to 
identify a public policy (as defined under Utah law) against age dis-
crimination in employment.55 Howe further argued that recognizing 
Burton’s claim would cause undue hardship on small employers.56 
In dissent, Associate Chief Justice Durham accused the majority 
of failing to carefully analyze the public policy justifying Burton’s 
claim.57 Durham also predicted that the majority’s decision would 
“create an enormous loophole which Utah employers may exploit to 
the detriment of many Utah employees.”58 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This section analyzes the reasoning of the majority and dissent-
ing opinions in Burton, focusing on two specific issues. First, it com-
 
 50. See Appellee’s Brief, at 6. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Three parties accepted the court’s invitation to submit an amicus brief. The ACLU 
and AFL-CIO each submitted an amicus brief on behalf of Burton. See Brief for Amicus 
ACLU, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000); 
Brief for Amicus ALF-CIO, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 
(Utah Jan. 19, 2000). Utah Manufacturers Association (a collection of various business inter-
ests) filed on behalf of Exam Center. See Brief for Amicus Utah Manufacturers, Burton v. 
Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000). 
 54. See Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469, at *6 (Utah Jan. 
19, 2000). 
 55. See id. at *5. 
 56. See id. at *6. 
 57. See id. at *7. 
 58. Id. 
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pares the relative strengths of the policy-related arguments made by 
the majority and dissent, concluding that the majority offered the 
stronger arguments. Second, it examines Burton’s claim under estab-
lished Utah law governing the tort of discharge in violation of public 
policy—a step the majority in Burton never took. This analysis shows 
that the supreme court rightfully rejected Burton’s claim. However, 
the majority’s focus on public policy rather than Burton’s failure to 
satisfy the tort’s established requirements made the decision appear 
to be a closer call than it truly was. 
A. Who is Correct—The Majority or the Dissent? 
1. The majority’s arguments 
The majority’s determination to affirm the district court’s deci-
sion was correct on both legal and public policy grounds for two rea-
sons. First, though Burton and amici ACLU and AFL-CIO raised 
compelling public policy reasons why the court should allow Burton 
to proceed with a tort claim based on discharge in violation of a pub-
lic policy, Exam Center’s policy arguments to the contrary were 
more persuasive. Second, the cases that Burton and Justice Durham’s 
dissent relied upon are easily distinguished from Burton’s facts. 
a. Separation of powers. The majority’s most powerful public pol-
icy argument involves the doctrine of separation of powers. With re-
spect to this doctrine, the majority indicated that “[d]ue respect for 
the legislative prerogative in lawmaking requires that the judiciary 
not interfere with enactments of the Legislature where disagreement 
is founded only on policy considerations and the legislative scheme 
employs reasonable means to effectuate a legitimate object.”59 
Two well-established principles of Utah law support the major-
ity’s separation of powers argument. First, Utah courts have recog-
nized that not only can the legislature create rights that do not exist 
at common law or under the Constitution but it can also limit the 
applicability of those rights to certain groups of individuals. Second, 
the courts have also maintained that when the legislature creates 
such a right, the judiciary’s role is limited to interpreting and apply-
ing the applicable law. These principles apply directly to protection 
from age discrimination, which is a legislatively-created right. 
 
 59. Id. at *5. 
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 (1) Legislative ability to create limited rights. Utah courts 
have previously recognized the right of the legislature to create rights 
that are limited to certain groups of individuals. Two examples illus-
trate this principle. The first is a judicial interpretation of Utah’s 
wrongful death statute, which created a right to bring a wrongful 
death claim that did not exist at common law, while the second in-
volves a decision sustaining a Utah statute limiting the right to re-
cover general damages in a personal injury claim. 
   (a) Wrongful death statute. In State Farm Mutual Auto 
Insurance Co. v. Clyde,60 the Utah Supreme Court entertained a 
claim brought under the wrongful death statute by grandparents of a 
minor child.61 Under Utah law, parents and guardians have a statuto-
rily created right to bring a cause of action against a party who 
caused the death of a minor.62 In Clyde, the plaintiffs argued that, 
because they had provided for the child’s maintenance and were her 
sole means of support, they should be able to recover under the 
wrongful death statute even though they were not the child’s bio-
logical parents.63 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that they 
were de facto parents or guardians and affirmed the district court’s 
decision to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.64 
While expressing sympathy for the grandparents’ loss, the court 
stated that “[t]he fact that the result in some circumstances may be 
to unreasonably restrict the class of persons who can bring a wrongful 
death action is an argument for amendment of the statute, not for 
our ignoring its words.”65 The court held that, even though the result 
may be unfortunate, the court was not entitled to “ignore the plain 
language of section 78-11-6.”66 
The Clyde court’s reasoning is equally applicable to the plaintiff’s 
claim in Burton. While the result for Burton (assuming that he was 
indeed discharged due to his age) may be unfortunate, the court 
must not ignore the UADA’s plain statutory language to remedy a 
perceived inequity. The court is thus limited to applying the statute 
 
 
 60. 920 P.2d 1184 (Utah 1996). 
 61. See id. at 1185. 
 62. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-6 (1998). 
 63. See Clyde, 920 P.2d at 1185. 
 64. See id. at 1186-87. 
 65. Id. at 1187 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 66. Id. 
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as written, rather than attempting to correct it. The proper method 
of statutory alteration is the legislative amendment process. 
  (b) Personal injury protection. Utah’s Personal Injury Pro-
tection (PIP) statute prevents an accident victim from collecting 
general damages unless certain conditions are met, such as the incur-
ring of medical expenses in excess of $3,000.67 In Warren v. Mel-
ville,68 the plaintiff’s medical expenses totaled $2,583.56; thus, based 
on express statutory language, the plaintiff was not entitled to collect 
general damages.69 
In defense of its decision to deny the plaintiff’s claim, the court 
stated that “we determine that Utah’s no-fault statute ‘should not be 
discarded because some members of the class have rights, which may 
be adversely affected.’”70 The court reasoned that “an individ-
ual’s. . .interests ‘may, in some cases, have to yield to the power of 
the Legislature to promote the public health, safety, morals, and wel-
fare.’”71 
Thus, the Warren court not only recognized the legislature’s 
power to limit statutorily created rights but also indicated that the 
legislature has the ability to substitute a right that existed for all indi-
viduals at common law with a statutory right applicable to a limited 
class of individuals. If it is appropriate for the courts to allow the leg-
islature to limit a common law right to a limited number of individu-
als as Warren states, then the courts should also defer to the legisla-
ture when it creates a limited right that did not exist at common law 
or under the Constitution. The legislature, therefore, acted well 
within its authority when it limited the UADA’s remedies. The Bur-
ton court correctly applied the law as stated. 
 (2) Deference to legislative intent. Utah courts have consis-
tently acknowledged that the legislature—and not the courts—is the 
proper body to effectuate changes to statutory law. Statements made 
 
 67. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-A-22-309 (1998). This statute limits the recovery of 
general damages to those persons whose medical expenses resulting from the accident exceed 
$3,000 or whose injuries include death, dismemberment, permanent disability, permanent im-
pairment, or permanent disfigurement. See id. 
 68. 937 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1997). 
 69. See id. at 558. 
 70. Id. at 561 (quoting Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 191 
P.2d 612, 624 (Utah 1948)). 
 71. Id. at 562 (quoting Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 677 (Utah 
1985)). 
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by the Utah Supreme Court in Stanton v. Stanton72 and State Farm 
Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Clyde73 illustrate the court’s recogni-
tion of the legislature’s prerogative to balance policies that it deems 
important. 
In Stanton, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted a state statute 
that set the age of majority for males at twenty-one and females at 
eighteen for determining support obligations in divorce cases.74 
While recognizing that the difference in age might be discriminatory, 
the court stated that “[d]ue to the important concept of separation 
of powers in our government, the courts should defer to the pre-
rogative of the legislature to make the laws, and confine their own ac-
tions to interpreting and applying them.”75 The court added that “in 
order to maintain and safeguard the balance of power so essential to 
our system of government, we think it is correct and desirable to ad-
here to a policy of caution and restraint in respect for the action of 
the legislature.”76 
The Burton majority’s approach to statutory interpretation paral-
lels that of the Stanton court. The majority concluded that “[d]ue 
respect for the legislative prerogative in lawmaking requires that the 
judiciary not interfere with enactments of the Legislature where dis-
agreement is founded only on policy considerations and the legisla-
tive scheme employs reasonable means to effectuate a legitimate 
end.”77 Thus, the majority properly limited its work to interpreting 
and applying the statute rather than modifying or partially repealing 
it. Allowing Burton to bring a tort claim for discharge in violation of 
a public policy would have indirectly modified the UADA rather 
than simply interpreting or applying it. 
Deference to legislative intent is appropriate even when the court 
believes the result to be inequitable. As previously discussed, the 
Clyde court realized that it could not ignore the statute’s plain lan-
guage even if it caused an inequitable result.78 This conclusion is 
equally applicable to Burton. While the class of persons protected by 
 
 72. 517 P.2d 1010 (Utah 1974), rev’d, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). 
 73. 920 P.2d 1184 (Utah 1996). 
 74. See Stanton, 517 P.2d at 1011. 
 75. Id. at 1011-12 (emphasis added). 
 76. Id. at 1012. 
 77. Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469, at *5 (Utah Jan. 19, 
2000). 
 78. See Clyde, 920 P.2d at 1187. 
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the UADA may be unreasonably restricted, this “is an argument for 
amendment of the statute, not for [the court’s] ignoring its words.”79 
The separation of powers argument in favor of Exam Center 
goes even further than illustrated in the above cases. The majority 
concluded that “[i]n matters not affecting fundamental rights, the 
prerogative of the legislative branch is broad and must by necessity 
be so if government is to be by the people through their elected rep-
resentatives and not by judges.”80 
b. Impact on small employers. In making its decision to reject Bur-
ton’s appeal, the Burton majority also considered the impact that 
recognizing the tort of discharge in violation of public policy would 
have on small employers. The majority found that allowing a tort 
claim would not only defeat the purposes of the statutory require-
ment establishing a minimum number of employees, but also would 
result in small employers bearing greater costs than would large em-
ployers, who are protected by the UADA.81 
The majority expressed an additional concern that smaller em-
ployers would not have the benefits of the “simplified procedure” 
provided by the UADA and would instead be subject to the longer 
statute of limitations and the full range of tort liability.82 The UADA, 
as previously explained, contains specific provisions detailing the pro-
cedure for an aggrieved individual to follow in making an employ-
ment discrimination claim.83 First, any claim must be filed within 
180 days.84 An investigator is then assigned to negotiate a settlement 
between the parties,85 and “[c]onciliation between the parties is to 
be urged and facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative process.”86 
The UADA’s extensive dispute resolution structure embodies the 
concept of a resolution process that is faster, less expensive, and fo-
cused on compromise settlements. 
The majority correctly argued that small employers would be 
worse off if subject to a tort claim because they would not receive 
 
 79. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152, 1157 
(Utah 1989)). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Burton, 2000 WL 38469, at *5-6. 
 82. See id. at *6. 
 83. See supra Part II.A.3; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-107 (1998). 
 84. See § 34A-5-107(1)(c). 
 85. See § 34A-5-107(3)(a). 
 86. See § 34A-5-107(10). 
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the protection afforded by the UADA’s administrative review proc-
ess. Even if the costs of actual compliance are simply ignored, the 
disadvantages to a small employer in the handling of possible claims 
are still readily apparent for several reasons. First, the small employer 
would be subject to a longer statute of limitations.87 Second, no in-
vestigator would be assigned to attempt settlement or evaluate the 
basis of the claim prior to litigation. Third, unlike the UADA, where 
the emphasis on conciliation avoids many costs, tort suits against 
small employers usually involve the costly (both in time and money) 
process of discovery as well as full-length trials. As a result, small em-
ployers would be better off under the UADA than they would be 
outside of its jurisdiction. Thus, recognizing the tort for discharge in 
violation of a public policy would clearly contradict what Congress 
envisioned when implementing Title VII and subsequent civil rights 
legislation (at least with respect to protecting small employers). 
2. The dissent: powerful arguments—just not powerful enough 
Justice Durham’s dissent raised powerful policy arguments ex-
plaining why the court should recognize Burton’s claim for discharge 
in violation of a public policy. She argued that failure to allow Bur-
ton’s claim to go forward would essentially give smaller employers 
license to discriminate against their employees and frustrate the legis-
lature’s goal of eliminating discrimination and undermine the quality 
of life enjoyed by both Utahans and society as a whole. 
a. License to discriminate? The dissent’s most compelling policy 
argument is that employers could construe the court’s refusal to rec-
ognize a tort claim for discharge in violation of a public policy as 
tacit approval for small employers to discriminate, based not only on 
age, but also on race, sex, religion, and disability.88 Thus, not  
 
 
 87. While an aggrieved individual would be required to file a complaint within 180 days, 
an employer not covered by the provisions of the UADA would be subject to the statute of 
limitations applicable to torts generally. Under Utah law, that is four years. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. 78-12-25 (1998). 
 88. See Burton, 2000 WL 38469, at *7 (Durham, J., dissenting). In addition, the 
amicus brief for the ACLU claimed that refusing to recognize the tort would result in small 
employers receiving a license to discriminate. See Brief for Amicus ACLU at 5-10, Burton v. 
Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000). However, the dis-
sent appeared to miss the mark. Public policy regarding discharge in violation of religion, race, 
or sex has been stated in other statutes or in the Utah State Constitution, and thus the tort 
would be available in those cases. 
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allowing a tort claim would allow employers with fewer than fifteen 
employees to discriminate without any serious repercussions. 89 
The dissent based its opinion on similar types of cases from other 
jurisdictions. One such case was Molesworth v. Brandon,90 in which a 
Maryland appellate court examined the issue of whether an employer 
should be exempt from claims of sexual discrimination simply be-
cause the employer had fewer than the fifteen employees required by 
statute.91 The court allowed the tort of discharge in violation of a 
public policy because Maryland’s “General Assembly [did not] in-
tend[] to grant small businesses in Maryland a license to discrimi-
nate.”92 
The Ohio Supreme Court made a similar finding in Collins v. 
Rizkana.93 At issue in Collins was an Ohio anti-discrimination statute 
(Ohio Revised Code Ann. 4112.01(A)(2)) requiring that an employer 
have four or more employees to be subject to the statute.94 The 
Collins court overturned a lower court’s grant of summary judgment 
to the defendant, ruling that the statute could not be interpreted “as 
an intent by the General Assembly to grant small businesses in Ohio 
a license to sexually harass/discriminate against their employees with 
impunity.”95 Rather, the statute was evidence of “an intention to ex-
empt small businesses from the burdens . . . [of the statute], not 
from its anti-discrimination policy.”96 The court concluded that “we 
cannot find it to be Ohio’s public policy that an employer with three 
employees may condition their employment upon the performance 
of sexual favors while an employer with four employees may not.”97 
 
 89. See Burton, 2000 WL 38469, at *7 (Durham, J., dissenting). This argument ignores 
any consequences a small employer would face resulting from age discrimination such as the 
loss of key employees, lower employee morale, and a poor business reputation. The statement 
is meant to address only the legal consequences of such actions. 
 90. 672 A.2d 608 (Md. 1996). 
 91. See id. at 609-10. 
 92. Id. at 615. The court held that Maryland’s policy “against sex discrimination is 
ubiquitous.” Id. at 613. In addition, the court pointed to “at least thirty-four statutes, one 
executive order, and one constitutional amendment in Maryland that prohibits discrimination 
based on sex in certain circumstances.” Id. Utah, on the other hand, has been virtually silent as 
to discrimination based on age. 
 93. 652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995). 
 94. See id. at 655. 
 95. Id at 660-61. 
 96. Id. at 661. 
 97. Id. The Collins court was able to point to other statutory provisions forbidding sex-
ual discrimination as well as a general public policy statement in one of the statutes forbidding 
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The power of the dissent’s argument is thus evidenced by two 
other states’ courts that openly rejected the notion of permitting 
small employers to discriminate while holding to a higher standard 
those employers who employed at least the statutory minimum. Both 
courts allowed a tort claim for discharge in violation of a public pol-
icy to go forward.98 The courts correctly concluded that efforts to 
eliminate employment discrimination should not be limited on the 
basis of the size of the employer. Discrimination should be either 
tolerated or eliminated. In any case, the solution to discrimination 
should not be a scheme that essentially grants “qualified immunity” 
to employers of certain size. 
In support of the dissent, a decision by the Utah Supreme Court 
recognizing a wrongful discharge in Burton would have sent a strong 
message to Utah citizens and surrounding states that age discrimina-
tion will not be tolerated. Also, the court would have bolstered the 
idea that any effort to purge society of discrimination is doomed to 
fail unless society consistently conveys that discrimination will not be 
tolerated in any form. 
b. Other policy arguments. The dissent also pointed to two other 
policy reasons why the lower court’s ruling should be overturned. 
First, the dissent argued that a significant majority (69.7%) of Utah 
employers employ less than fifteen employees, the UADA’s statutory 
minimum number. Thus, failure to allow a tort of discharge in viola-
tion of a public policy would frustrate the broad goal of the legisla-
ture to eliminate discrimination.99 Second, the dissent contended 
that “the way in which a state regulates relations between employees  
 
 
the practices of sexual discrimination. See id. at 658. Once again, other statutes and a public 
policy statement forbidding age discrimination cannot be found under Utah law. 
 98. Two other states addressed the issue of age discrimination. The Supreme Court of 
Washington allowed the tort claim to go forward on the strength of a statute separate from 
Washington’s equivalent of the UADA, which stated a public policy and implied a remedy. See 
Bennett v. Hardy, 784 P.2d 1258, 1262-66 (Wash. 1990). However, the court did not “reach 
plaintiffs’ claim that the statutory scheme treats employees of small firms in such a way as to 
offend the state constitution’s privileges and immunities clause.” Id. at 1260. Conversely, the 
Supreme Court of California openly rejected recognizing a tort for discharge in violation of a 
public policy because the employer did not employ at least five employees. See Jennings v. Mar-
ralle, 876 P.2d 1074, 1079-81 (Cal. 1994). The court held that “while the Legislature has 
made a broad statement of policy, it has not extended that policy to small employers.” Id. at 
1079. 
 99. See Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469, at *9 (Utah Jan. 
19, 2000). 
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and employers has a significant impact on the quality of life for many 
of its citizens and ultimately for the society as a whole.”100 
The power of the dissent’s arguments is evident in the percent-
ages alone. Nearly seventy percent of Utah employers employ less 
than fifteen employees.101 Thus, the dissent intimates that seventy 
percent of Utah employers have now been given a license to engage 
in age-based discrimination. As the dissent succinctly stated, the ma-
jority’s decision creates “an enormous loophole which Utah employ-
ers may exploit to the detriment of many Utah employees.”102 
c. The forgotten public policy argument. The dissent omitted a po-
tentially significant policy argument stemming from general tort law. 
A common tort principle states that when in doubt, in cases of inten-
tional injury, the burden of the injury should lie with the party caus-
ing the harm.103 Furthermore, a court should not determine whether 
a cause of action exists based on the status of the victim (or worse 
yet, the status of the tortfeasor) instead of the wrong suffered. 
Together, these arguments support the dissent’s conclusion that 
the Burton court should have acknowledged the tort of discharge in 
violation of a public policy. In an employment context, it seems only 
fair that a defendant should bear the burden of paying damages if his 
or her actions resulted in the unfair discharge of the plaintiff. This 
question of fairness directly affects Burton, who is left without a 
remedy because his tort claim cannot go forward.104 Moreover, the 
dissent could have argued that the intent of the UADA was not to 
guarantee an employee access to recovery if that employee happened 
to be the fifteenth employee but deny access if an employee hap-
pened to be the fourteenth employee. 
3. Public policy and other considerations favoring the majority 
In many ways, neither party deserved to lose the public policy 
side of this case. Each party pointed to compelling reasons why the 
Utah Supreme Court should rule in its favor. Burton thus begs the 
 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. 
 102. Id. at *7. 
 103. See, e.g., PROSSER ET AL., TORTS-CASES AND MATERIALS, 17-88 (9th ed. 1994). 
 104. Appellant urged that the Utah State Constitution requires a remedy under its open 
courts provisions. See Brief for Appellant at 11, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 
2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000). 
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question: which should the courts favor, the rights of the individual 
or the collective legislative majority? 
Despite the fact that both the majority and the dissent advanced 
solid public policy reasons for their respective decisions, there are 
three reasons why the majority’s public policy arguments are ulti-
mately more compelling. First, the balance of powers doctrine re-
quires the legislature to legislate and the courts to interpret and en-
force the law. Second, by effectively overruling the provisions of the 
UADA, the court would jeopardize all other Title VII statutory 
schemes. Third, there are compelling reasons besides the UADA that 
will encourage employers not to discriminate. 
a. Legislatures should legislate and courts should enforce. While 
there is a valid argument to be made that the courts should resolve 
inequities created by the legislature, Burton is not a case for the 
court to do so. Legislatures are naturally better equipped to handle 
the extensive research and analysis that the legislative process re-
quires. Furthermore, legislatures are often called upon to balance 
competing public policy interests. Overruling the statutory scheme in 
an effort to eradicate age discrimination would ignore other impor-
tant issues considered in the development of the UADA. While the 
legislature is concerned with eliminating discrimination of all types, it 
has other concerns as well. The viability of small businesses is also 
important. Though age discrimination may cost some employees 
their jobs, the failure of small businesses would cause the loss of jobs 
as well. 
A powerful argument can be made that refusal to allow the tort 
of discharge in violation of a public policy will promote inequity 
based on the status of the employee. While true, this argument also 
misses the mark. The current statute expressly provides for this type 
of inequity. Employees must reach the age of forty before protection 
becomes effective. Should the court refuse to overturn this age limi-
tation, is it licensing the ability to discriminate against individuals 
that are under the age of forty? 
Furthermore, discrimination in favor of older employees is per-
fectly legal under the statute as it now stands. Simply put, for a vari-
ety of reasons, the line has to be drawn somewhere. When the con-
flict takes place close to the line, the inequities always seem more 
apparent. Nevertheless, it is the role of the legislature to draw that 
line, and the court must respect that line despite its beliefs about 
possible inequities. 
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b. The domino effect. Title VII and its subsequent legislation limit 
their coverage based on the number of employees. By recognizing 
the tort of discharge in violation of a public policy, especially in the 
absence of a clear statement of that policy, all legislative employment 
schemes that incorporate some sort of minimum employee require-
ment become suspect. 
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) serves as an appro-
priate example.105 The FMLA applies only to employers with at least 
fifty employees.106 It contains an important benefit, if not right, al-
lowing individuals to take time away from work to care for a sick 
loved one without fear of losing their employment.107 Congress, 
however, expressly limited this right to those persons who work for 
employers with fifty or more employees. A possible explanation for 
this is that, as with Title VII and the ADEA, Congress was attempt-
ing to weigh competing policy concerns. 
Likewise, by allowing a claim for tortious discharge in violation 
of a public policy, the court would effectively overturn the UADA’s 
minimum employee requirement, which would place at risk similar 
schemes that protect against sex and age discrimination, guarantee 
family medical leave, and provide other similar statutory benefits. 
Simply put, nullifying the minimum employee requirement would 
ignore the public policy reasons that Congress considered in 
developing the requirement. While it may be argued that changes are 
needed in these areas, it would be wiser to note that need and allow 
the legislature, in its proper role, to evaluate competing public poli-
cies and then balance the policies accordingly. 
c. Other deterrents outside of the legal process that encourage 
employers not to discriminate. The dissent’s public policy arguments 
ignore that there are several reasons outside the legal arena that dis-
courage employers from discriminating on the basis of age. For ex-
ample, an employer who consistently discriminates based on age or 
any other criteria will suffer greater turnover of employees. In addi-
tion, employee morale suffers in a work place where discrimination is 
tolerated. Finally, the reputation of a business will be stained if it be-
comes recognized as a discriminating employer. 
 
 
 105. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994). 
 106. See § 2611(4)(a)(I). 
 107. See generally § 2612 (outlining various levels of leave benefits). 
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d. Conclusion. To state that the majority has the better end of the 
public policy debate is not to discount the dissent’s arguments alto-
gether. Clearly, the court should send messages that discourage 
rather than encourage discrimination. Furthermore, when in doubt, 
courts should hold a tortfeasor liable for the damages caused by his 
or her inappropriate behavior. However, the juggling of competing 
public policies is best performed by a body responsible to the mem-
bers of society it purports to represent—the legislature. The majority 
therefore correctly concluded that “the prerogative of the legislative 
branch is broad and must by necessity be so if government is to be by the 
people through their elected representatives and not by judges.”108 
B. Stumbling at the Finish Line: What the Majority Should Have Done 
Differently 
The majority did a good job of pointing to countervailing public 
policy reasons that are sufficient to justify the majority’s decision to 
not recognize the tort of discharge in violation of a public policy. 
However, the court never truly analyzed Burton’s claim in the con-
text in which it was brought. A simple application of the Ryan test109 
to Burton’s claim would have led the majority to the inescapable 
conclusion that Burton’s claim simply fails to meet the requirements 
of a claim for discharge in violation of a public policy as set forth un-
der Utah law.110 Instead, the majority, in a cursory manner, merely 
dismissed Burton’s attempt to establish a public policy against age 
discrimination.111 
1. Burton’s claim under the Ryan analysis 
As previously mentioned, the four prongs of the Ryan test for 
tortious discharge in violation of public policy require the plaintiff to 
show: (1) the discharge of the employee by the employer; (2) the ex-
istence of a clear and substantial public policy; (3) the fact that the 
employee’s conduct brought the policy into play; and (4) there exists 
 
 108. Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469, at *5 (Utah Jan. 19, 
2000) (emphasis added). 
 109. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 110. In fairness to the majority, it is unclear whether either party or any of the amicus 
briefs filed pursued a thorough Ryan analysis either. 
 111. See Burton, 2000 WL 38469, at *4-5. Not only is the court’s analysis cursory, but it 
is also incomplete, addressing only one of the four prongs of the Ryan test. See id. 
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a causal connection between the discharge and the conduct that 
brought the public policy into play.112 A close analysis of Burton’s 
claim under this test reveals that his claim simply falls short of meet-
ing the requirements of the tort. 
a. Discharge. The facts of Burton easily satisfy the first prong of 
the Ryan test. All that is required is a showing that the employee has 
been discharged.113 Although the parties disagreed about the reasons 
underlying Burton’s termination, neither disputed the fact that Bur-
ton was discharged.114 
b. Public policy. The second prong of the test—that a clear and 
substantial public policy exists115—was the element of the Ryan test 
most contested by the parties.116 The standard in Ryan indicates that 
“[a] public policy is ‘clear’ only if plainly defined by legislative en-
actments, constitutional standards, or judicial decisions.”117 
 (1) The absence of public policy statements in Utah legislative 
enactments, constitutional standards, and judicial decisions. Legisla-
tive enactments concerning employment discrimination in Utah are 
few and far between. Indeed, Burton and amici ACLU and AFL-
CIO located only two Utah laws that address age discrimination in 
 
 
 
 112. See Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 404 (Utah 1998). 
 113. See id. 
 114. See Brief for Appellant at 3, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 
38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000). (claiming that Burton was discharged because of age); Brief for 
Appellee at 5, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 
2000) (arguing that Burton’s discharge was the result of his services no longer being required). 
 115. See Ryan, 972 P.2d at 404. 
 116. The issue of a clear and substantial policy was argued in all briefs submitted to the 
court. Appellant’s argument regarding this issue covered nearly four full pages. See Brief for 
Appellant at 7-10, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 
19, 2000). Likewise, Appellee’s discussion of the issue took up more than five pages. See Brief 
for Appellee at 8-13, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 
19, 2000). Amicus Utah Manufacturer’s Association dedicated four pages of its brief to the 
issue, see Brief for Amicus Utah Manufacturers Burton v. Exam Center Indus., at 7-11, No. 
980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000), while amicus AFL-CIO dedicated four pages, 
see Brief for Amicus ALF-CIO at 5-8, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 
38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000), and amicus ACLU dedicated two pages (followed by eight pages 
arguing that the UADA underscores the existing clear and substantial public policy), see Brief 
for Amicus ACLU at 3-10, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 
(Utah Jan. 19, 2000). 
 117. Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405. 
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the employment context: the UADA118 and a now-repealed statute 
that applied only to the State as an employer.119 
  (a) Public policy in the UADA. The UADA, as a clear 
statement of a public policy, is limited to what it says on its face.120 
The relevant portion of the statute states that “[i]t is a discriminatory 
or prohibited employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire, 
or promote, or to discharge . . . any person . . . because of . . . age, if 
the individual is 40 years of age or older.”121 However, the UADA 
defines an “employer” as a person “employing 15 or more employ-
ees.”122 Thus, the UADA does not apply to employers of fewer than 
fifteen employees. As the majority concluded, “[the Utah] legislature 
has made a . . . decision to prohibit age discrimination in the termi-
nation of employees only by large employers.”123 
Furthermore, the UADA is devoid of any general statement of 
public policy. In other words, the Act details actions that constitute 
discrimination, defines various terms, and outlines the complaint 
procedure to follow but never states the public policy reasons under-
lying the legislature’s implementation of the Act. 
In contrast, in Molesworth v. Brandon, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals had a public policy statement to which it could point.124 The 
court used this public policy and considered the plaintiff’s claim for 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy even though the 
plaintiff’s employer had fewer than fifteen employees, as required 
under Maryland’s Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA).125 While 
sustaining the plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge in violation of a 
public policy, the court referred to the public policy statement in 
FEPA for support.126 That statement declared that 
[i]t is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of Maryland, in the 
exercise of its police power for the protection of the public safety, 
public health and general welfare, for the maintenance of business 
 
 118. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-102 (1998). 
 119. See § 67-10-2(4) (repealed 1995). 
 120. See Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405. 
 121. § 34A-5-106(1)(a)(i). 
 122. § 34A-5-102(8). 
 123. Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469, at *4 (Utah Jan. 19, 
2000). 
 124. 672 A.2d 608 (Md. 1996). 
 125. See id. at 611-12; see also MD. CODE ANN. § 14 (1957). 
 126. See Molesworth, 672 A.2d at 611-12. 
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and good government and for the promotion of the State’s trade, 
commerce and manufacturers to assure all persons equal opportunity 
in receiving employment and in all labor management-union rela-
tions regardless of race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin, 
sex, age, marital status, or physical or mental handicap unrelated in 
nature and extent so as to reasonably preclude the performance of 
the employment, and to that end to prohibit discrimination in em-
ployment by any person, group, labor organization, organization or 
any employer or his agents.127 
The Burton dissent’s reliance on Molesworth is unfounded.128 The 
UADA is devoid of any kind of public policy statement similar to the 
one contained in the Maryland statute. Therefore, it cannot be said 
that the UADA contains a clear statement of public policy against 
employment discrimination regardless of the size of the employer. 
  (b) Public policy and the state as employer. Amicus ACLU 
argued that a clear statement of public policy could be found in a 
state law, since repealed but applicable at the time of the suit, that 
prohibited employment discrimination by the State in its employ-
ment practices.129 The majority correctly dismissed this argument, 
despite the fact that it did so with little analysis,130 noting only that 
“[w]hile arguably a public policy can be found in that statute[,] . . . 
it obviously has no application to a private employer.”131 
Amicus ACLU’s argument is fatally flawed for three reasons. 
First, it overlooks the fact that the statute has been repealed and that 
a case should be both determined upon those laws in force at the 
time of decision and based on the relevant public policy at the time 
of decision.132 Second, the law’s statement of public policy reflects 
the legislature’s intent with respect to how the State should handle 
its employment matters.133 Finally, the replacement state regulation  
 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Burton, 2000 WL 38469, at *9 (Durham, J., dissenting). 
 129. See Brief for Amicus ACLU at 3, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., No. 980040, 2000 
WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-2(4) (repealed 1995)). 
 130. See Burton, 2000 WL 38469, at *5. 
 131. Id. at *4. 
 132. See, e.g., Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (holding generally that a 
court’s decision is to be based on law at the time of actual decision rather than at time the suit 
was filed). 
 133. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-2(4) (1998). 
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lacks a public policy statement;134 thus, any clear public policy that 
may have existed no longer does. 
The lack of a legislative enactment that plainly defines Utah’s 
public policy against discrimination is compounded by an absence of 
such a policy in the Utah State Constitution as well as state jurispru-
dence. With respect to Utah jurisprudence, the Burton case appears 
to be one of first impression, meaning that there is not a judicial 
public policy statement on which Burton could rely. While Burton 
could argue that there always has to be a first case, it does not neces-
sarily follow that Burton’s claim is a good candidate. The plaintiff’s 
inability to point to a legislative enactment, constitutional provision, 
or judicial decision was fatal to his claim. 
 (2) The absence of substantial public interests. In addition to 
the existence of a “clear policy,” it is necessary that the policy “fur-
ther substantial public, as opposed to private, interests.”135 Burton’s 
claim apparently would qualify because preventing his discharge 
would advance the public interest against age-based employment dis-
crimination. His claim fails, however, because the requirement that 
the policy further substantial public interests is additional to the re-
quirement of the existence of a clear policy. Unfortunately for Bur-
ton, that clear policy does not exist and cannot be replaced by a fa-
vorable decision that advances the public interest against age 
discrimination. Burton’s claim thus fails the second prong of the 
Ryan test. 
c. Employee conduct. Had Burton carefully framed his argument, 
he possibly could have satisfied the third prong of the Ryan test, 
which directs that the employee’s conduct must bring the public pol-
icy into play.136 In order to meet the third prong, however, Burton 
must first prove the existence of a clear public policy. Though no 
such policy exists (for reasons explained above), this Note assumes, 
for purposes of further inquiry, that the second prong of the Ryan 
test was met. 
In Peterson v. Browning,137 the Utah Supreme Court listed three 
actions that typically fall within the public policy exception relating 
to the termination of employment: “(1) refusing to commit an illegal 
 
 134. See UTAH ADMIN. CODE R606-3-2 (1997). 
 135. Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 405 (Utah 1998). 
 136. See id. at 404. 
 137. 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992). 
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or wrongful act, (2) performing a public obligation, or (3) exercising 
a legal right or privilege.”138 Burton’s discharge by Exam Center 
clearly falls outside the three examples given by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
Ryan, however, offers Burton another possibility. The Ryan 
court stated in a footnote that an alternative way of characterizing 
the third prong was to determine whether discharging employees in 
circumstances similar to the plaintiff’s would place the public policy 
in jeopardy.139 Thus, Burton could have argued that discharging in-
dividuals on the basis of age would jeopardize the public policy 
against age discrimination.140 However, this argument ignores the 
countervailing public policy arguments supporting the limitation of 
the UADA’s applicability, namely, protecting small employers from 
the cost of compliance and avoiding governmental intervention into 
intimate business relationships. Once again, the existence of a public 
policy (prong two of the Ryan analysis) would have to be established 
before the court could take this additional step, assuming that the 
court was willing to analyze Burton’s claim based on the Ryan foot-
note. 
d. Causal connection. Ryan’s final requirement mandates that 
there be a causal connection between the discharge and the conduct 
bringing the policy into play.141 As indicated previously, causation 
was disputed by the parties: Burton claimed that his termination was 
due to his age, but Exam Center argued that the discharge resulted 
from a lack of need for Burton’s services.142 To prevail on this point, 
Burton would need to prove that the discharge truly resulted from 
his age. However, as the case was before the court on the 
 
 
 138. Id. at 1281 (quoting Goldsmith, supra note 37, at 166-67). 
 139. See Ryan, 972 P.2d at 404 n.4. 
 140. Interestingly, amicus Utah Manufacturers Association argued that a claim for dis-
charge in violation of public policy requires that the discharge be based on employee conduct 
and not status. See Brief for Amicus Utah Manufacturers at 19, Burton v. Exam Center Indus., 
at 22-23 No. 980040, 2000 WL 38469 (Utah Jan. 19, 2000). In Burton, the plaintiff alleg-
edly was not discharged based on his conduct but because he was too old (status). See supra 
Part III.A. While this argument’s logic is sound and appears to be based on the “typical” dis-
charges in violation of public policy set forth in various cases, footnote four in Ryan would 
give the court an opportunity to extend the tort of discharge in violation of a public policy be-
yond cases involving strictly employee conduct. See Ryan, 972 P.2d at 404 n.4. 
 141. See Ryan, 972 P.2d at 404. 
 142. See supra note 114. 
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defendant’s motion to dismiss, any analysis of the “merits” of the 
case in this Note would be premature. 
The fourth requirement repeats the third prong’s conduct lan-
guage—that the employee’s conduct must bring the public policy 
into play. As a result, the alternative in footnote four of Ryan—
determining whether discharging circumstances similar to the plain-
tiff’s would jeopardize the public policy—could be extended to cover 
the fourth prong as well. Thus, the need for employee conduct 
would be obviated. 
e. Conclusion: falling short of the Ryan requirements. While Bur-
ton arguably met the first prong and plausibly could satisfy the third 
and fourth prongs of the Ryan test, his claim failed to satisfy the re-
quirements of the second prong—the existence of a clear public pol-
icy. The court has consistently made statements as to the narrowness 
with which public policy should be construed.143 In any case, Burton 
failed to demonstrate a clear public policy as defined by legislative 
enactment, constitutional provision, or judicial decision. 
Burton’s failure to demonstrate the existence of a public policy is 
singularly fatal to his claim and obviated the need for the court to 
engage in further analysis. However, such a decision could have been 
made after oral arguments without requesting amicus briefs, and, 
therefore, was not likely considered by the majority. Since the public 
policy arguments on both sides are strong, the court’s decision was 
reduced to arguments based on public policy rather than a strict in-
terpretation of the Ryan test. Thus, one is left with the sense that the 
court’s decision was a response to the emotion of public policy rather 
than a thorough legal analysis. By failing to thoroughly analyze Bur-
ton’s claim on a legal basis, the court made the decision appear much 
closer and more difficult than it actually was. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The decision facing the Utah Supreme Court in Burton v. Exam 
Center Industrial should not have been as difficult as the court 
 
 143.See Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405 (recognizing the importance of keeping the scope of the 
public policy exception narrow to avoid unreasonably eliminating employer discretion in dis-
charging employees); see also Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1992) (indi-
cating that narrow construction of public policies upon which wrongful terminations may be 
based is appropriate to avoid eliminating employer discretion in discharging at-will employees); 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989) (explaining that courts 
must be careful to avoid the overextension of public policy). 
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made it. The court correctly upheld the statutory scheme set up by 
the Utah legislature under the UADA, even though it meant that 
some individuals (like Burton) suffered real harms that will go with-
out remedy. In so doing, the majority correctly decided that rather 
than effecting change through judicial “legislation,” any proposed 
change in the balancing of public priorities ought to take place in the 
legislature. However, the majority’s failure to apply the Ryan test in 
its entirety creates the impression that the case was decided on public 
policy alone. While public policy arguments are particularly crucial to 
the debate in the present case, the majority failed to sufficiently es-
tablish one key fact: Burton’s claim simply does not meet the re-
quirements for the tort of discharge in violation of a public policy. 
While most would agree that the fight against discrimination has 
made progress, few would argue that the success has been complete 
or that all residue of discrimination no longer exists in our society. 
The defeat of discrimination in all of its forms will not occur until all 
of us, on an individual basis, truly accept that discrimination in any 
form is improper. Until society as a whole comes to that realization, 
it is wiser to allow the will of the majority, as expressed by its elected 
representatives, to make tough policy decisions, even when a few in-
dividuals are left without a remedy. Expanding the scope of the tort 
of discharge in violation of a public policy in general, and the defini-
tion of public policy in particular, is not the answer; neither is legis-
lating from the bench—even when the cause appears to be just. 
Evan S. Tilton∗  
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